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IN T H E SUPREME C O U R T
OF T H E STATE OF U T A H

FELT SYNDICATE, INC.
Plaintiff and Appellant,
— vs. —
HARTFORD ACCIDENT &
INDEMNITY COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No. 8736

Brief of Felt Syndicate, Xnc*
Appellant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the purposes of this brief, we will refer to the
parties as Felt, Hartford, Cassady, Title Company and
Prudential which are the respective designations used
in the transcript and in the briefs of counsel heretofore
filed in this consolidated proceeding. In addition, we
will use the transcript and record designations set forth
on page 3 of Hartford's brief.
1
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By reason of the consolidation of these cases, the
facts have been rather completely stated in the briefs
submitted by Hartford, Prudential and the Title Company. Due to the particular problem applicable to the
appeal of Felt, some duplication, we feel, is necessary.
Felt, during the early p a r t of 1950, acquired a tract
of land in Salt Lake County, and platted and subdivided
this land prior to July 19th, 1950, under the name of
"Morningside Heights." (Ex. Pr. 2.) On July 19th,
1950, Felt entered into a written agreement with Cassady which generally provided that Cassady would
cause to be constructed one hundred homes on the lots
of the subdivision (Ex. Pr. 2). The time within which
Cassady was to complete the construction of the homes
and the maximum cost for the construction of each home
was specifically treated in this agreement (Ex. Pr. 2).
Additional provisions recited that out of the amounts
derived from the sale of the homes and lots, Cassady
would receive its construction costs, Felt would receive
reimbursement for land and street improvements together with its miscellaneous administrative
and legal
expenses, and any net profit would then be divided
equally between Felt and Cassady (Ex. Pr. 2).
It was further provided on page 3 of the agreement
of August 10th, 1950, and in the schedules thereto
attached, that Felt would receive directly from the disbursing agent specifically set forth amounts as " F e l t
Miscellaneous" funds (Ex. P r . 8). It has been stipulated
that the amount which Felt was not paid on this miscellaneous account totaled $17,173.43 (Tr. 20).

2
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In May of 1950, Felt entered into an agreement
with Wright-Wirthlin Company, a realtor in Salt Lake,
to sell the one hundred homes in Morningside Heights
(Ex. H-31). Prior to March 22, 1951, the Wright-Wirthlin Company had sold all of the homes and had due and
owing it from Felt, $19,100.00 of the agreed sales commission (Ex. H-31). On the 22nd day of March, 1951,
Felt entered into an agreement entitled "Assignment
and Agreement'' wherein it was the announced intention
of the parties to thereby "secure the said obligation"
owing to Wright-Wirthlin,

and Wright-Wirthlin,

in

consideration thereof, covenanted to "forego any action
or immediate procedure'' against Felt on the account
(Ex. H-31).
I t is pertinent to note also that by the agreement,
Wright-Wirthlin did not credit the account due from
Felt for amy sums not actually received by WrightWirthlin, and it was expressly announced in paragraph
(5) that nothing in the agreement should " b e construed
to waive or impair any right Wright-Wirthlin Company
may have to the full and complete s u m " owing to it by
Felt (Ex. H-31).
In its answer, Hartford interposed several defenses,
none of which raised the issue that Felt was not the
real party in interest as to the miscellaneous account,
and at no time during the two pretrials was an issue
framed or a defense made that Felt was not the real
party in interest as to the miscellaneous account.
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At the conclusion of the trial in the Lower Court,
the respondent here, Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Company, for the first time moved to strike a portion
of the claimed damages of Felt which related to the
account labelled "Felt Miscellaneous Fund" on the
ground that the appellant was not the real party in
interest thereto. This motion was granted by the Lower
Court, and the sum of $14,761.80, together with interest
at 6%, was thereupon excluded from the judgment
awarded to this appellant. The appeal here taken by
Felt is based upon the Lower Court's ruling on the
aforesaid motion.
STATEMENT OF POINTS—APPELLANT'S BRIEF
POINT I.
AN ASSIGNOR WHO HAS ASSIGNED A CONTRACT
RIGHT TO HIS CREDITOR FOR SECURITY PURPOSES
ONLY IS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IN AN ACTION
TO ENFORCE THE CONTRACT RIGHT.
POINT II.
A MOTION TO ABATE OR DISMISS A CAUSE OF
ACTION ON THE GROUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS
NOT A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IS WAIVED BY
DEFENDANT IF INTERPOSED FOR THE FIRST TIME
AT THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE.
POINT I.
AN ASSIGNOR WHO HAS ASSIGNED A CONTRACT
RIGHT TO HIS CREDITOR FOR SECURITY PURPOSES
4 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ONLY IS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IN AN ACTION
TO ENFORCE THE CONTRACT RIGHT.
On the 22nd of March, 1951, Felt, the appellant
here, was indebted to Wright-Wirthlin Company for
real estate commissions on the sale of the lots in the
subdivision in the sum of $19,100.00. Felt contends that
the money with which to discharge this just obligation
was not available because Hartford's principal, Cassady,
had not fulfilled its construction contract, thereby prohibiting the disbursement of the stage of completion
advances.
An "Assignment and Agreement" was entered into
between Wright-Wirthlin and Felt on the 22nd of
March, 1951, from which it is evident the following facts
then existed (Ex. H-31):
1. That Wright-Wirthlin had theretofore sold
all of the 100 lots in the subdivision pursuant
to the contract between Wright-Wirthlin and
Felt.
2. That the contract commission agreed to be
paid to Wright-Wirthlin from Felt was in the
total sum of $30,000.00.
3. That there was then long past due and owing
to Wright-Wirthlin from Felt, the total sum
of $19,100.00.
4. That Wright-Wirthlin was threatening Felt
with court action to enforce payment of the
commission due. (Para. 4, Ex. H. 31.)
An inspection of the "Assignment and Agreement"
discloses:
5 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1. That the parties, by making the assignment
of the " F e l t Miscellaneous F u n d , " intended
only
' ' . . . to secure the said obligation . . . "
between Wright-Wirthlin and Felt. (See first
recital, Ex. H-31.)
2. That only 89.6% of the amounts received
thereafter in the miscellaneous fund would be
transferred to Wright-Wirthlin to apply on
the obligation due from Felt.
3. That the mere " a s s i g n m e n t " of the amounts
to become due the miscellaneous fund effected
no reduction in the amount due from Felt to
Wright-Wirthlin.
(See para. 5, Ex. H-31).
Consequently, Felt could only reduce its obligation owing Wright-Wirthlin if and as disbursements from the miscellaneous account
were made.
4. Felt at all times retained free from the
assignment for security purposes, 10.4% of
the miscellaneous account.
5. Wright-Wirthlin, with its obligation due from
Felt secured by the "Agreement and Assignment," agreed to withhold court action to
collect the obligation (Para. 4, Ex. H-31).
It is of further probative value, in light of the law
to be hereafter discussed, that Wright-Wirthlin re-assigned their interest in the miscellaneous account to Felt
on the 20th of December, 1956, over three months prior
to the date upon which the evidence was closed in this
proceeding and over three months prior to the date
upon which Hartford, for the first time, raised its
defense that Felt was not the real party in interest to
89.6% of the miscellaneous account.
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May we repeat, that the Lower Court in its judgment found that the " F e l t Miscellaneous F u n d " was a
proper portion of Felt's damages proximately arising
from the many substantial contract breaches by Cassady,
but further found that Felt was not the " r e a l party in
interest" as to 89.6% of the miscellaneous account. The
lower court excluded $14,761.80 from the account, and
awarded Felt judgment which included only the remaining 10.4% of the miscellaneous account.
Felt's position, initially, is that under the Utah
Eules of Civil Procedure, it ivas the real party in interest
as to the entire miscellaneous account even though a
security assignment had been made to Wright-Wirthlin.
Prior to the adoption of real party in interest
statutes, the common law rule was that an assignee of
a chose in action could only bring suit in the name of
his assignor. See 39 Am. Jur. 871. One of the primary
purposes for the adoption of the real party in interest
statutes is to extend the right to maintain a suit to the
assignee. (See 39 Am. Jur. 871). This extension of the
right to maintain the action, however, does not, per se,
bar the remedy of the beneficial assignor:
" I t is often stated to be the general rule that
the equitable owner of a claim sued upon may
sue as the real party in interest . . . " (39 Am.
J u r . 871.)
Most text writers agree that real party in interest
statutes are designed to authorize and allow those parties who hold the beneficial interest

but not the legal
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title, to a document or chose or right, to maintain the
action. The exceptions in the real party in interest
statutes extend the right to sue to the holders of the
legal title and do not remove the right of the equitable
or beneficial owner to maintain the action. This interpretation has been adopted by most courts, including
the courts of Utah, as we shall later show. 39 Am. Jur.
872.

Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
provides:

Procedure

' ' Real P a r t y in Interest. Every action shall
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest; but an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with
whom or in whose name a contract has been made
for the benefit of another, or a party authorized
by statute may sue in his own name without joining with him the party for whose benefit the
action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another
shall be brought in the name of the state of
U t a h . " (Emphasis ours)
The intent of the foregoing rule seems evident from
its plain provisions — this is, that those interested in
the proceeding are the proper parties to bring the matter
before the court.
The foregoing construction has been placed on the
rule in the State of Utah for many years and has been
the subject of consideration before this court on numerous occasions.
8
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F o r example, it seems quite well established that
beneficiaries under a trust may bring an action in their
own names as the real parties in interest when they are
to be benefited or directly concerned with the outcome
of the proceeding. See Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemm,
et al., 76 Utah 372, wherein it was stated by this court:
" I t will be noted (from the statute) that the
right of certain fiduciaries to sue is an exception
to the general mandate that every action must
be brought in the name of the real party in
interest. The privilege conferred upon the fiduciaries to sue is permissive. Nothing in the statute prohibits the real party in interest
from
suing in his own name in any proper case JJ
This court has further spoken on the subject in
considering the status of a third party beneficiary. See
M. H. Walker Electric Company vs. American
Surety
Company of New York, 60 Utah 435, wherein this court
stated :
'' This much, however, can be said with reasonable assurance: That whenever it appears from
a contract that there is a clear intent to benefit
a third party, whether specifically named in the
contract or not, such person, ordinarily, may sue
in his own name for the enforcement thereof or
for the benefits arising therefrom. This general
proposition, we believe, is well sustained by the
great preponderance of judicial opinion in the
several states of the Union.''
Based upon the foregoing quoted rule and upon
the decisions of this court, we deem it fairly well settled
that it is not essential in maintaining an action that the
9
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bare legal title be fixed in the plaintiff. We deem it
equally well settled that if the plaintiff is to ^e benefited
from the results of the litigation, such plaintiff is a real
party in interest in the proceeding.
The facts here, without contradiction, disclose that
Felt was indebted to Wright-Wirthlin in the sum of
$19,100.00 prior to the execution of the " Agreement and
Assignment" and that after the "Agreement and Assignm e n t " was executed and delivered to Wright-Wirthlin,
Felt Syndicate was still obligated to Wright-Wirthlin
in the same amount. The "Agreement and Assignment"
did not therefore effect a discharge of the obligation due
Wright-Wirthlin by Felt nor in any way result in a
reduction of the obligation. The amount due WrightWirthlin was a continuing obligation from the date of
the "Agreement and Assignment" up to and including
the date the lower court entered its judgment herein.
Of further significance is the fact that both parties
announced in the agreement that it was made only to
secure the obligation due Wright-Wirthlin. As such,
Felt was at all times directly pecuniarily interested
in the miscellaneous account, for the collections, if any,
on the miscellaneous account would directly affect Felt's
continuing obligation to Wright-Wirthlin. As such, Felt
should be deemed to be the real party in interest to the
entire miscellaneous account.
We can see no significant difference between the
interest of Felt in this miscellaneous account and the
interest of the third party beneficiary in the Walker case,
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

supra, nor in the interest of the beneficiaries in the trust
before this court in the Salina Canyon Coal case, supra.
A close analogy is set forth in the case of Dickey
vs. Porter, et aL, 101 S.W. 586. In that case a plaintiff had secured a loan with the bank by assigning to
the bank a tax bill. The court there held that the pledgor,
the one who gave the security interest, was a real party
in interest in the proceeding. In appropriate language
the court there said, p. 593:
" B y his note to the bank, the plaintiff became
absolutely indebted to the bank, whether the lien
was valid and enforceable or not. If he had permitted that statute of limitation to run, and the
tax bill should thereby have become valueless as
a security, his obligation to the bank would have
still remained absolute. The bank was taking no
step to enforce the lien, and, having brought this
suit, it is obvious that it (the assignor) was the
plaintiff who was to be benefited or injured by
the judgment rendered in this case. The general
title to the tax bill remained in the plaintiff a t
the date of the commencement of the suit, subject only to the lien of the bank."
I t was further noted by the court in the case of
Ball-Thrash & Co. v. McCormick, 78 S.E. 303, that a
pledgor could maintain an action on a note and mortgage
held by the pledgee and in so doing it quoted with approval the case of Wells vs. Wells, 53 Vt. 1, wherein that
court said:
" 'And here it is to be remarked that the
that the note and mortgage were held by
defendants as collateral did not stand in the
of the orators proceeding either by suit at
11
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on the note or by foreclosure on the mortgage, if
they deemed it for their interest to have the note
or the mortgage, or both, enforced earlier than
the defendants saw fit to proceed in that behalf.
See Am. Law Rev Oct. 1880, p. 693. The court
would see to it that the rights and interests of
the pledgee were protected in reference to the
collateral at the same time that the pledgor was
acting in regard to his own existing reversionary
interest in the pledge, by the proceeding to enforce it, as against the debtor in the pledge.' The
writer of the article in the American Law Review,
referred to in that case, states the law to be that
the pledgor has an interest in the thing deposited
in pledge, and is not restricted to the remedy of
tender or repayment, and the pledgee will be
protected in his rights by an order that he shall
be first paid out of the fund derived from the sale
of the property pledged or its collection, if a
note.''
May we further draw the court's attention to the
fact that over three months prior to the close of the
evidence in this proceeding all of the rights in the
miscellaneous account assigned to Wright-Wirthlin had
been re-assigned to Felt and consequently Felt has at
all times since the 20th of December, 1956, been in a
position to directly discharge the total obligation which
Hartford has under its bond.
Based upon the statute and the foregoing authorities Felt respectfully submits that it is and at all times
has been the real party in interest to the entire miscellaneous account, and that the lower court erred when
it excluded the sum of $14,761.80, together with accrued
interest, from the judgment awarded to Felt.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law12
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POINT II.
A MOTION TO ABATE OR DISMISS A CAUSE OF
ACTION ON THE GROUND THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS
NOT A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IS WAIVED BY
DEFENDANT IF INTERPOSED FOR THE FIRST TIME
AT THE CLOSE OF THE EVIDENCE.
No defense was made in the answer filed by Hartford that Felt was not the real party in interest to all
of the miscellaneous account. Further, no motion was
made between the date of the answer and the first pretrial that Felt was not the real party in interest as to
the miscellaneous account, nor was such an issue raised
at either of the two pretrial proceedings by Hartford.
The first time that Hartford made mention that it relied
on a defense that Felt was not the real party in interest
to the miscellaneous account was at the close of Felt's
evidence. The lower court ruled in favor of Hartford
upon the motion being made and excluded $14,761.80,
which was 89.6% of the miscellaneous account, on the
ground that as to this portion of the miscellaneous
account, Felt was not the real party in interest.
Felt contends that this affirmative defense of Hartford's had been waived.
It is provided in Rule 8(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure

that:

" A party shall state in short and plain terms
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall
admit or deny the averments upon which the
adverse party relies . . . "
13 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Rule 8(c)
provides:

of the Utah Rules

of Civil

Procedure

" I n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy,
duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud,
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license,
payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds,
statute of limitations, waiver, and any other
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense . . . " (Emphasis ours)
And, further, Ride 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
"A party ivaives all defenses and objections
which he does not present either by motion as
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no
motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that
the defense of failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the defense of failure to
join an indispensable party, and the objection of
failure to state a legal defense to a claim may
also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2)
that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the court shall dismiss the action.
The foregoing language of our rules seem clear
and unambiguous and is designed to give proper and
timely notice to a plaintiff of the defenses which he
must be prepared to meet. It further seems settled that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law14
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if affirmative defenses are not pleaded or interposed
by a motion that they are thereby waived.
Here, the record is uncontroverted that no defense
was raised in the pleadings or interposed by a motion
on behalf of Hartford that the plaintiff here was not
the real party in interest to the entire miscellaneous
account. Even during the two pretrials had before
Judge Ellett, no issue was even mentioned by Hartford
that it would defend upon the ground that Felt was not
the real party in interest. Not until the close of Felt's
evidence was mention thereof made.
We, therefore, believe that the plain language of
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is properly applicable and that by reason thereof Hartford
waived its defenses and objections that Felt was not the
real party in interest to the entire miscellaneous account.
The foregoing rules are rules of essential justice
for they permit parties who believe their rights are
properly being pursued and represented to rely upon
the rules as they are plainly written and there would
seem to be no doubt here that if Hartford had properly
raised the defense of real party in interest during the
four years in which these proceedings have been before
the court that Wright-Wirthlin could have come in and
made itself a party plaintiff if the court had then
granted Hartford's motion. It is significant also to note
that this Supreme Court has previously treated this
problem in the case of Fritz v. The Western Union Telegraph Company and The Rio Grande Western
Railway
15
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Company, 25 Utah 263, 280, wherein the court had before
it the timeliness of an objection made during the course
of the trial that an assignee was not a real party in
interest. This court therein stated t h a t :
" . . . this objection (that the plaintiff was not
the real party in interest) was urged too late,
and must be held to have been waived. "The objection that the plaintiff in an action is not the
real party in interest, as required by the Code,
when available by way of defense, must be raised
by demurrer or answer, or it will be considered
to have been waived.' 15 Enc. PL and P r a c , 713;
Eev. St. sec 2966; Smith v. Hall, 67 N.Y. 50;
Spooner v. Railroad Co., 115 N.Y. 30, 21 N.E.
696; Trust Co. v. Brown, 59 Mo. App. 4 6 1 . "
The spirit and intent of the Fritz case, supra, is
plainly incorporated in the present Rules of Civil Procedure and we respectfully submit that in face of the
Rules and the Fritz case the lower court here has
plainly erred in excluding $14,761.80 of the miscellaneous
account due this plaintiff.
ANSWER OF FELT SYNDICATE, INC., APPELLANT,
TO THE BRIEF FILED BY HARTFORD ACCIDENT
AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, RESPONDENT.
Special Note: This case was consolidated for appellate purposes with cases Nos. 8719 and 8720. The
respondent here, Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Company, has filed its consolidated brief in all of the
cases mentioned. The remaining portion of this brief
will, therefore, be devoted to answering the brief of
Hartford.
16
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S T A T E M E N T OF POINTS
IN ANSWER TO H A R T F O R D B R I E F
POINT I.
FELT DID NOT COMMIT ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR
MATERIAL BREACHES OF THE CONTRACT.
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS NOS. 18 AND
20, ALL TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WERE NO
SUBSTANTIAL BREACHES OF THE CONTRACTS BY
FELT, ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
1. The Lack of Funds Was Due to Cassady's
Breaches and Not to Any Alleged Substantial Breach
by Felt.
2. The Court's Finding that the Assignment of the
Miscellaneous Account Due Felt Was Not a Substantial
Breach of the Contracts is Supported By the Evidence.
3. Hartford Was Allowed an Offset for Felt's
Failure to Provide a Power Connection to Cassady and
the Finding By the Court That Felt's Failure to Supply
Electrical Power Was of No Consequence is Supported
By the Record.
4. Hartford Alleges That Cassady Was Not Reimbursed F o r Extras But the Record Would Not Support
the Award For Other Extras.
POINT I I .

THE PARTIES TO THE PRIMARY CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT BOND COMPRO17
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MISED AND SETTLED ANY AND ALL ALLEGED
PRIOR BREACHES OF CONTRACT BY THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 1951.
POINT I I I .
HARTFORD IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16,
1951, COMPROMISED AND SETTLED PRIOR ALLEGED
BREACHES BY FELT AND PRUDENTIAL.
POINT IV.
FAILURE TO PAY FRANCHISE TAXES AFTER A
FOREIGN CORPORATION CEASES TO DO BUSINESS
IN UTAH WILL NOT BAR IT FROM THEREAFTER
MAINTAINING AN ACTION IN UTAH COURTS.
ARGUMENT
In its brief, Hartford has totally ignored the oft
repeated appellate rule that a successful plaintiff is
entitled to have this court consider all of the evidence
and every fair inference to be derived therefrom in the
light most favorable to him. (Beck v. Jeppsen, 1 Utah
2d, 127, 262 P. 2d 760; Cutler Association vs. Be Jay
Stores, 3 Utah 2d 107, 279 Pac. 2d 700.) After attacking
the trial court's findings with controverted evidence
gleaned merely from Cassady, Hartford's bond principal who was charged with supervision of the project,
Hartford proceeds to interpret the evidence to exonerate
its principal from fault concerning the project's failure.
18Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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From this erroneous basis, Hartford then places the
blame on Felt and Prudential Federal and applies
general principles of law to demonstrate error in the
lower court.
The complete absence in Hartford's brief of an
analysis of the record to demonstrate that the judgment
of the lower court was supported by substantial evidence graphically indicates the absence of substance in
Hartford's position here. It is well settled by this court
that the findings and conclusions of the lower court, if
supported by competent evidence, will not be disturbed
on appeal. The foregoing is the only issue before this
court insofar as Hartford's affirmative position is
concerned.
POINT I.
FELT DID NOT COMMIT ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR
MATERIAL BREACHES OF THE CONTRACT.
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS NOS. 18 AND
20, ALL TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WERE
NO SUBSTANTIAL BREACHES OF THE CONTRACTS BY FELT, ARE SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
(Note: Felt adopts here the applicable portions of
Points I and II argued by the able counsel for
Prudential, in their brief. In addition Felt sets
forth the following answer to Hartford.)
1. The Lack of Funds Was Due to Cassady's
Breaches
and Not to Any Alleged Substantial Breach by Felt.
19 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Hartford misinterprets the significance of Finding
No. 18, which is as follows:
" A n y delay in disbursing the mortgage proceeds by Prudential at the commencement of
work in the summer of 1950 on the Morningside
Heights project was caused by Cassady prematurely commencing work on the project before the
execution, delivery and recording of mortgages
executed by the veteran borrowers. Cassady
knew that Prudential would not disburse the
mortgage proceeds until mortgages were properly
executed and recorded. The time lag thereby
occasioned was the direct and immediate result
of Cassady's own action in commencing construction work before mortgage funds were available
under the terms of said several contracts. Cassady assumed this risk of his own volition and
choice."
The purpose of this finding is not, as Hartford
would infer, that Cassady was obliged to await the
recordation of the final mortgage of the applying veterans, but merely that Cassady knew of the conditions
of obtaining reimbursement but chose to disregard the
interests of all parties and continue construction according to his own whim.
By his own testimony, Cassady knew that the success of the entire project depended upon the loans being
made after mortgages were recorded. (T. 299). He was
made fully aware of the fact that continued construction
was contingent upon sales being made, mortgages being
recorded and delivery being made to the purchasers
when the first disbursal was made in August, 1950. (T.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law20
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262). He checked the records of sales and the progress
of financing of the individual houses every day at the
Felt Syndicate offices. (T. 322) Only for the first thirtyday period was the sales program unsynchronized with
the construction program and Cassady was informed of
this so that he could exercise his own judgment as to
which lot to work upon. (T. 321-322) After this short
period, the sales program was brought into line with
construction. (T. 348) Cassady recognized that in a
project of this type it is necessary for a contractor to
invest considerable capital in order to efficiently operate
during the period preceding the commencement of
progress payments. (E. 295) Despite the knowledge that
he did not have sufficient funds to support a program
of this type, Cassady chose to work on houses which
were not yet sold rather than to aid all parties in obtaining the funds which he knew would be available from
loans made on houses which were sold. It is significant
to also note that not a single dwelling was ever completed by Cassady even though $725,735.27 was paid to
him or in his behalf for actual contraction costs. (Ex.
F . 10)
When the mortgages were recorded, an inspection
was made of the homes to determine the extent of their
completion and thereafter, funds were disbursed accordingly. (T. 366)
I t is undoubtedly true that in order to complete the
project in the quickest and most inexpensive manner,
the work was planned to move forward on a wholesale
basis. However, the record shows that innumerable
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delays in construction caused deterioration of the completed work (T. 153-155, Ex. F-25), that sales previously
made were cancelled (T. 39, 62, 323), and that in some
homes, even the preliminary work failed to pass inspection (Ex. F-24). In a letter written as late as June 13th,
1951, Cassady wrote to one of his subcontractors (Ex.
H-33):
" I have had numerous complaints from you
regarding the lack of materials available on the
job. In this I concur in that at times we have
had shortages of various items. However, at no
time has there ever been a material
shortage
which would ever necessitate the laying-off of
men nor prevented the hiring of additional men
if the ivork were progressing systematically.
This
has been explained to you in detail." (Emphasis
ours)
There were breaches on the part of the parties to
the agreement, some of which were unavoidable at the
inception of the project, but because this was a profitsharing agreement the exhibits show that each was
making an effort to correct its own faults, make adjustments for the breaches of others, and continue with the
contract. Thus, the evidence justifies the court's finding
that Cassady had within his control the means by which
the entire project would have profited. Therefore, the
short delay in the sales program during the first thirtyday period was insubstantial and not the proximate
cause of the loss at all, and the lower court so found.
The lower court's Finding No. 20 is as follows:
' c Felt did not breach its contractual obligations to Cassady or to Hartford in any substantial
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manner and any differences between them were
resolved by extensions of time granted to Cassady Company, Inc. and by the Supplemental
Agreement (PR6) between the parties entered
into February 16, 1951."
Hartford points out that Felt had an obligation to
Cassady to pay according to the course of construction
and that said obligation was not qualified as to recording
mortgages, sales program, or any other consideration.
It neglects to point out that since this was a profitsharing agreement whereby the contractor, as well as
the owner, hoped to achieve substantial ultimate gain,
they were disposed to, and did in fact by their conduct,
disregard inconsequential and rectifiable breaches and
did continue with their contract.
The period of delay in payments to Cassady, as
demonstrated by Ex. H-32, a letter from Cassady to
Felt, occurred very early in the project. The mortgage
recording delays, however, were under control by the
middle of September, 1950 (T. 348); by December, 1950,
all loans had been closed and mortgages recorded so
that the proceeds of all loans were available for disbursement to Cassady as the work progressed (T. 66, T. 1056). Even under these admitted facts, Cassady still did
not see fit thereafter to complete one of the one hundred
homes. This was the very crux of the money problem.
2. The Court's Finding That The Assignment Of The
Miscellaneous Account Due Felt Was Not A Substantial Breach Of The Contracts Is Supported
By
The Evidence.
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A real estate firm, known here as Wright-Wirthlin,
sold the 100 lots under a commission contract with Felt.
Felt contends that by reason of Cassady's default which
resulted in the unavailability of funds from the project,
it was unable to discharge the commission obligation to
Wright-Wirthlin. After many calls to Prudential Federal (T. 86) and apparently after threatening Felt with
court proceedings, Felt assigned its interest for security
purposes only to Wright-Wirthlin (Ex. H-31). The only
contention Hartford made that this assignment was a
material breach of the contract was that it effected, in
some unascertained way, a disability to enter into a
modified contract whereby certain mortgage funds in the
hands of Prudential would be applied to the project. A
close reading of the transcript citations in Hartford's
brief will disclose that only one of the stockholders of
Felt ever assented to the application of the funds to
the construction project. It seems extremely abstract
to excuse Cassady's previous continuing and substantial
breaches of the contract by a simple diversionary argument as to the executory application of funds by an
agreement which was never executed. The court was
of the opinion that this assignment by Felt was of no
consequence when compared to Cassady's substantial
and material breaches and this record certainly supports
the conclusion of the lower court in this regard.
3. Hartford Was Allotved An Offset For Felt's Failure
To Provide A Power Connection To Cassady And
The Finding By The Court That Felt's Failure To
Supply Electrical Power Was Of No Consequence Is
Supported By The Record.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law24
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

One of the impressive things about Hartford's brief
is the way it is "grabbing at s t r a w s " to save itself from
the judgment, one of the prime examples of which is the
way it complains about the failure of Felt to supply
the power to the project. Felt admits that power was
unavailable when construction was commenced, but the
record fully supports the finding of the lower court
that such failure was of no consequence. Mr. B. D. Scott
testified that at all times during the period of construction portable power generators were available for Cassady to use on the project and Cassady did obtain a
portable power generator to supply all of his power
needs. (T. 313-314) In addition, the Court has allowed
an offset for the small amounts expended by Cassady
for this additional cost. (Felt E. 43)
4. Hartford Alleges That Cassady Was Not Reimbursed
For Extras But The Record Would Not Support The
Award For Other Extras.
The only extra found by the Court to be of any
merit was the portable power generators previously
discussed. The only other extras which Cassady tacitly
complains of not being reimbursed for were all of such
a nebulous nature as to not warrant discussion. Suffice
it to say, that they were all required by the Veterans'
Administration to meet the building requirements; that
Cassady was fully informed of these requirements by
reason of his construction experience prior to the time
he signed the contracts; and that even under these
circumstances Cassady still did not finish any of the
homes to meet the requirements of the Veterans' Ad25 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ministration so that all parties could be saved from their
damages.
This whole line of counter accusations, arising as
it does after suit is brought some years after the
claimed breaches, recalls the language of Larsen v.
Knight, 120 Utah 265, 233 P . 2d 365:
" A party claiming a right ought not to appear
to acquiesce in non-performance by the other
party until the time has gone by for such performance and then claim damages."
POINT II.
THE PARTIES TO THE PRIMARY CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACT AND THE CONTRACT BOND COMPROMISED AND SETTLED ANY AND ALL ALLEGED
PRIOR BREACHES OF CONTRACT BY THE SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16, 1951.
POINT I I I .
HARTFORD IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE
SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 16,
1951, COMPROMISED AND SETTLED PRIOR ALLEGED
BREACHES BY FELT AND PRUDENTIAL.
(Felt under these two foregoing points adopts the
argument made by the able counsel for Prudential
under their Points III and IV, and, in addition thereto,
presents the following:)
Felt deems it significant that Hartford has not in
its appeal brief traversed the findings of the lower
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court that its principal, Cassady, waived any alleged
breaches of the plaintiffs; nor that Cassady and Hartford compromised and settled all alleged contract
breaches occurring prior to the Supplemental Agreement of February 16, 1951; nor that Hartford was
estopped by said agreement from denying such compromise and settlement. It would seem admitted that these
findings of the lower court are supported by adequate
and competent evidence and would, therefore, fully
justify an affirmation of the lower court's findings.
The Supplemental Agreement, Exhibit PR6, was
entered into by the parties as an amendment to their
original contracts, Exhibits (PR2) and (PE8), in an
attempt to rejuvenate the failing project. Cassady
stated that his main purpose for executing this Supplementary Agreement was to obtain additional time for
completing his contract. (T. 253) At that time all the
loans had been closed and mortgages recorded. (T. 105)
Consequently, all of the money under the contracts
would have been available at that time if Cassady wrould
have then performed pursuant to the terms of all of the
agreements.
The Supplementary Agreement recited, inter alia:
" W H E R E A S , conditions have arisen whereby
the parties deem it necessary and expedient to
amend, modify, supplement and adjust certain
provisions of the Primary Contract, and certain
of the provisions of the Disbursing Contract, as
amended by the supplemental agreement of August 22, 1950.
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" N O W , T H E R E F O R E , in consideration of
the premises and of the mutual promises and
agreements of the parties hereto and of the
benefits to be mutually derived from the amendments, modification and adjustment of the aforesaid contracts, the parties agree hereto as
follows:
ARTICLE III
" 3 . CASSADY hereby irrevocably admits
that it has secured from SYNDICATE and
ACCOUNTANTS an accounting of the proceeds of all funds paid by P R U D E N T I A L to
ACCOUNTANTS. CASSADY, PRUDENTIAL and SYNDICATE each do hereby confirm and approve all of said disbursements by
ACCOUNTANTS to the date hereof.
A R T I C L E IV
" 2 . SYNDICATE, CASSADY and ACCOUNTANTS hereby irrevocably admit that
they, and each of them, have secured from
P R U D E N T I A L an accounting of the proceeds
of all mortgage loans and down payments and
the disbursal of same by P R U D E N T I A L to
the date hereof. SYNDICATE, CASSADY
and ACCOUNTANTS do each hereby confirm
and approve all of said disbursements by
P R U D E N T I A L to the date hereof, and do
hereby admit, agree and declare that PRUD E N T I A L has performed all of its obligations
under said Primary Contract and Disbursing
Contract and supplement thereto dated the
22nd day of August, 1950, from the respective
dates thereof to the date of this Supplemental
Agreement."
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This agreement irrefutably establishes a complete
acceptance and acquittal of the payment theretofore
made to Cassady from the project and directly points to
the fact that it was Cassady who thereafter failed to
perform.
On the issue of waiver and estoppel we cite to the
Court the following authorities:
Restatement of Contracts,
25 Am. Jur. 653;

Sec. 300;

Farrington v. Granite State Fire Ins Co. of Portsmouth, et al., Utah, 120 Utah 109, 232 Pac. 2d.
754;
Larson v. Knight, 120 Utah 265, 233 Pac. 2d 365;
Sprague v. Boyle's Brothers Drilling Co., 4 Utah
2d 344, 294 Pac. 2d 689.
By the agreement of February 16, 1951, Cassady
was given an extension of time until June 1, 1951, to
complete the homes which under the agreement of July
19, 1950, should have been finished before January, 1951.
It is significant that in this agreement Cassady made
no claim for extras and no claim of any damages by
reason of any alleged prior breaches by Felt. He did
not ask for any construction cost adjustment. Cassady
needed more time to finish the houses and Felt was
willing to give Cassady additional time. Certainly
neither Cassady nor Hartford should be permitted to
alter or vary the terms of the supplemental agreement
(Ex. Pr. 6) by making claims now which were not
deemed sufficiently important to assert at that time.
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Indeed the modifying agreement (Ex. Pr. 6) expressly
provided:
" A R T I C L E IV, P A G E 6
" T h i s Supplemental Agreement shall be and
become effective from the date hereof upon the
approval thereof by Pacific Coast Title Insurance
Company and Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Company and upon becoming effective shall not
modify, amend or affect the provisions of the
Primary Contract, Construction Contract, Disbursing Contract and supplement thereto dated
August 22, 1950, except as herein specifically
provided."
Notwithstanding this provision, counsel for Hartford, asserting no breaches of the February 16, 1951,
agreement, now desires to rewrite it and include in it
claims for self-styled " e x t r a s " , prior breaches, and
immunity from subsequent breaches by Cassady.
I t was not claimed nor proved in the evidence by
Hartford that there were any breaches of the agreement
by Felt which occurred subsequent to this agreement of
February 16, 1951, nor did they claim any subsequent
breaches by Prudential.
POINT IV.
FAILURE TO PAY FRANCHISE TAXES AFTER A
FOREIGN CORPORATION CEASES TO DO BUSINESS
IN UTAH WILL NOT BAR IT FROM THEREAFTER
MAINTAINING AN ACTION IN UTAH COURTS.
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Hartford contends that Felt's right to maintain
this action was forfeited by the provisions of Section
59-13-61, Utah Code Ann., 1953, which reads as follows:
" I f a tax computed and levied hereunder
(Corporate Franchise Act) is not paid before
five o'clock P.M. on the last day of the eleventh
month after the date of delinquency, the corporate powers, rights and privileges of the delinquent taxpayer, if it is a domestic corporation,
shall be suspended, and if a foreign corporation,
it shall thereupon forfeit its rights to do intrastate business in this state."
(Emphasis supplied)
Hartford's counsel, by two identical motions, urged
their position in this matter in the lower court. One
motion was heard before the Honorable Ray Van Cott,
J r . and the other motion was heard at pretrial before
the Honorable A. H. Ellett. Both motions were denied.
Counsel for Hartford contend that the words in the
statute "forfeit its right to do intrastate business in
this s t a t e " encompass all corporate rights, including
the right to maintain this action. Felt, on the other hand,
contends that the quoted words can only be construed
to forfeit Felt's rights to do "intrastate business," and
cannot be construed to disable Felt from maintaining
this lawsuit.
Felt was incorporated in and pursuant to the laws
of the State of Nevada and was duly qualified to do
business in the State of Utah on March 28, 1950. This
qualification antedated all of the contracts and agree31 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ments with which we are here concerned. There is no
question presented in this record, nor by Hartford, that
Felt was not at all times duly and regularly qualified
and franchised to participate in business activity within
the State of Utah during the construction of Morningside Heights Subdivision; at the time the agreements
in evidence were executed; and at the time the sales of
the various lots were made. Felt concedes that it did
not pay a franchise tax after it ceased to conduct intrastate business in Utah and that its right to do an intrastate business was forfeited on September 22, 1952.
An inspection of Section 59-13-61, U.C.A., 1953, sets
forth in clear and unambiguous terms what is forfeited
by a foreign corporation when it does not pay a franchise tax. The statute specifically provides that only
"the right to do intrastate business" is forfeited. It
does not say, as contended by counsel for Hartford, that
its charter is revoked, nor does it say that its existence
is ended. The statute merely states that the foreign
corporation's right to do intrastate business in Utah is
forfeited. We thus see that if maintaining a lawsuit is
excluded from the phrase "intrastate business," Felt
still does and at all times herein mentioned did possess
the right to maintain this action in the State of Utah.
The words "intrastate business" have been defined
quite clearly by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
In the case of George R. Barse Live Stock Company
The Range Valley Cattle Company

v.

and J . M. Dart, 16

Utah 59, 65, the court said:
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" . . . 'to do business,' as defined by Webster,
is 'to carry on any particular occupation or employment for a livelihood or gain, as agriculture,
trade, mechanic arts, or profession; that which
busies or occupies the time, attention, or labor of
one.' The statute applies to foreign corporations.
The constitution applies to all corporations. In
our opinion, the constitution, when reasonably
construed, was intended to prohibit corporations
from transacting their ordinary corporate business within the state without first complying with
its terms, and having one or more places of business, with an authorized resident agent upon
whom process could be served in cases of litigation between them and citizens of the state, and
to protect citizens of the state against fraud and
imposition by insolvent and unrealiable corporations, and place them in a position to be reached
by the legal process of the courts of the state,
and was not designed or intended to prohibit the
doing of one single act of business by such corporation, with no apparent intention to do any
other act, or to engage in corporate business.
The bringing of a suit by a foreign corporation to
secure its legal rights, under the circumstances
shown in this case, is not (doing business/
within
the constitution or laws of this state."
(Emphasis supplied)
An outstanding review of the authorities was made by
the Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Marchant v.
National Reserve Co. of America, 137 P. 2d 331, 338,
and the court therein quoted from the Barse Live Stock
case,, supra, with approval. The court therein stated:
" T o summarize, then, the law may be stated
to be, from the foregoing decisions, that to be
1
doing business' in a state, a corporation must be
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engaged in a continuing course of business, rather
than a few isolated transactions, whether those
transactions are within the usual scope of that
corporation's business or not. There must be at
least some permanence about the presence and
business transactions of the corporation within
the s t a t e . "
The foregoing cases have not been overruled by this
court. It, therefore, seems settled in Utah that a foreign
corporation is not doing " i n t r a s t a t e business" in Utah
merely by bringing an action in the courts of Utah to
enforce its rights.
We have reviewed the cases cited by Hartford in
its brief, consisting of Aalwyn's Law Institute v. Martin, 159 P. 158 (Cal.); U. 8. F. & G. Co. v. Matthews, 274
P. 769; Reed v. Norman, 302 P . 2d 690; and Liebson v.
Henry, 356 Mo. 953, 204 S.W. 2d 310. We respectfully
submit that none of those cases involved a fact situation
similar to the case at bar. Each of those cases concerned
substantially different statutory provisions and only involved domestic corporations.
I t follows that the lower court correctly denied
Hartford's motion each time it was made.
CONCLUSION
In its brief Hartford has avoided the well-established rule applicable to appellate review and has argued
against matters determined by the lower court which are
fully substantiated by the evidence. Felt met its burden
of proof in the lower court, and the record supports the
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findings and conclusions that material and substantial
breaches by Cassady were the proximate cause of the
damages sustained by all the plaintiffs, including Felt.
Hartford, in consideration of a substantial premium,
guaranteed the performance by Cassady. Hartford has
conceded that Cassady altogether failed to perform. He
did not complete one house of the one hundred. Funds
that were payable to Felt on the miscellaneous account
and on the profit account were used to complete the
project. Hartford in justice and in all good conscience
should have performed on its bond instead of joining
Cassady in default.
For reasons set forth in this brief, it is further clear
that the lower court erred in excluding the portion of
the miscellaneous account due Felt in computing its
judgment; and the amount of $14,761.80 plus interest
from the date of default should be added to the judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
WOODROW D. W H I T E and
C. P R E S T O N ALLEN,
Attorneys for
Felt Syndicate,
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